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ABSTRACT
ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND THE ADOPTION
OF AN EXTREMIST POLICY OF GENOCIDE:
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF ARMENIA AND RWANDA
by
Nicole Powell
University of New Hampshire, September, 2006

The events leading up to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 are
similar to the events that led to the genocide that occurred in the Ottoman Empire
in 1915. Economic and political crises plagued both states, international
pressures to democratize weighed on both states, and both states were subject
to ethnic polarization. This project examines those common factors preceding
the Rwandan and Armenian genocides; and looks at elite’s perception of a threat
to their power because of the existence of those factors. Furthermore, the paper
examines the relationship between the perception of a threat to elite power and
the subsequent adoption of a genocidal policy. This comparative, most similar
systems case study of the Rwandan and Armenian genocides provides a model
that suggests a trajectory for the adoption of a genocidal policy. Recognizing
precursory factors that are perceived to threaten elite’s and lead them to adopt a
radical policy of genocide may enable the prevention of the most horrific atrocity
still afflicting the twenty-first century.
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INTRODUCTION

Ethnic cleansing, genocide, politicide, and democide are phenomena that
have scarred the 20th century.1 Despite the adoption of the Genocide
Convention in 1948, genocide continues to plague the world. The convention
was adopted by the United Nations pledging an assurance that genocide would
never again be repeated. Yet, mass killing has ensued regardless of the promise
made by the international community. Scholar R. J. Rummel estimates that
during the 20th century political regimes have murdered 170,000,000 of their own
citizens and foreigners. Those 170,000,000 people represent about four times
the number of individuals killed in all international and domestic wars and
revolutions (Rummel 1995, 3). Unfortunately, mass murder has not disappeared
with the close of the 20th century; rather it continues to account for the deaths of
hundreds of thousands of people this century.
Prior to 1955, the most commonly referenced occurrences of mass
killings are the Armenian Genocide in 1915, Stalin’s state engineered famine in

1 Merriam Webster defines ethnic cleansing as “the expulsion, imprisonment or killing of an ethnic
minority by a dominant majority in order to achieve ethnic homogeneity." Genocide has been
defined by the United Nation in Article II of the Genocide Convention and by various scholars who
have qualms with the UN definition. Barbara Harff has offered definitions of the terms genocide
and politicide. Her definitions are utilized in this project. She defines genocides and politicides in
Peace and Conflict 2005 as “the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained
policies by governing elites or their agents—or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending
authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized
ethnic group.” Rummel defines democide as: “the intentional killing of people of people by the
government.” Democide accounts for the variety and extent of ruthless murder carried out by
governments. Democide includes politicide and genocide (Rummel 1995, 3-4). These terms are
similar in nature.

1
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Ukraine in 1933, the rape of Nanking in 1937-1938, and the Nazi Holocaust from
1938-1945. Pol Pot’s genocide in Cambodia from 1975-1979, the Anfal
Campaign in 1988, the genocide in Bosnia from 1992-1995, and the Rwandan
genocide in 1994 are mass murders that occurred in the latter half of the 20th
century. The crisis in Darfur and Iraq could be considered the most recent
accounts of mass killing in the 21st century. Understanding certain cases of
genocide provides insights that may be relevant to understanding the
phenomenon in general.
Examples of genocide include Joseph Stalin’s engineered famine in
Ukraine in 1932. The famine was an attempt by Stalin to destroy those seeking
independence from his rule. By the spring of 1933, 25,000 people were dying
daily. Entire villages perished. By the end of 1933, 25 percent of the Ukrainian
population, including 3 million children, had died as a result of Stalin’s policy of
genocide (United Human Rights Council, Ukraine Famine).
In perhaps the most widely studied instance, the German Holocaust
accounts for the deaths of approximately six million Jews. The Nazi party
believed that Germans were racially superior to the Jews and aimed to remove
the Jewish population in Europe. The United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum (USHMM) provides a statistic that details the toll the genocide took on
the Jewish population in Europe: “By 1945, close to two out of every three
European Jews had been killed as part of the Final Solution, the Nazi policy to
murder the Jews of Europe” (USHMM).

2
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In another case, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge Army marched into Phnom Penh
and seized control of Cambodia on April 17,1975 (United Human Rights Council,
Cambodia Genocide Pol Pot). From 1975 to 1979, 2,000,000 people died in
Cambodia under Pol Pot’s rule. The three largest ethnic minority groups were
subject to genocide. Ultimately, estimates suggest that fifty percent of the
Chinese living in Cambodia in 1975 perished under this regime (United Human
Rights Council, Cambodia Genocide Pol Pot).
In 1988, the Anfal campaign conducted by the Iraqi regime against the
Kurdish population cost the lives of 50,000 to 200,000 Kurdish civilians
(Leezenberg 2004, 375). Between 1992 and 1995 in the Republic of BosniaHerzegovina ethnic cleansing resulted in the murder of 200,000 Muslims (United
Human Rights Council, Bosnia Genocide). Throughout 1993, the Serbs in
Bosnia freely committed genocide against the Muslims. The devastation that had
ensued cost 200,000 lives, more than 20,000 went missing, and 2,000,000 had
become refugees (United Human Rights Council, Bosnia Genocide).
Genocide can occur in any region in the world and devastate any
community. The cases of interest in this study are the Armenian genocide and
the Rwandan genocide. The Armenian genocide is considered the first genocide
of the 20th century. Armenian men, women, and children were mass murdered in
an effort, led by the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, to Turkify
the Ottoman Empire. The genocide ultimately cost the Armenians residing in the
Ottoman Empire over half their population (Astourian 1990,113-114). 1,500,000
people perished during this crisis. In Rwanda, over a period of three months in

3
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1994, approximately 1,000,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered in a
genocidal campaign.
Scholar Barbara Harff found forty-one cases of genocide and politicide in
the world since 1955 (Harff 2005, 57). The study of genocide is a difficult but
imperative endeavor that may help abate the murder of innocent people. The
section below highlights both the definitional dilemmas and previous efforts to
study genocide.

The Definition and Study of Genocide
This study refers to the United Nation’s definition of genocide to facilitate
an understanding of the violence that occurred in Rwanda and Armenia.
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish Jurist coined the term ‘genocide’ in 1944. He
played a major role in drafting the United Nations Genocide Convention which
was adopted by the United Nations on December 9, 1948. 2 Article II of the
United Nations Genocide Convention defines genocide to include:
Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another.

Genocide scholars highlight some of the challenges associated with the
United Nation’s definition and the particulars constituting an act of genocide

2 The term genocide was created by combining the Greek word genos, translating to race or tribe,
and the Latin derivative cide meaning to kill.

4
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(Heidenrich, 2001; Williams 2003; Trotten 2004). They note that the United
Nation’s definition of genocide excludes political and socioeconomic groups from
targeted groups. In addition, it lacks specificity of the magnitude of killing
necessary to constitute genocide (Heidenrich 2001, 2; Williams 2003, 194).
These murky areas have inspired alternative definitions of genocide. These
alternative definitions have been used to research genocide3 (Trotten et al.
2004, 4).
This study relies on Alex Alverez’s (2001) examination of the general
commonalities found among the definitions. His findings conclude that generally
scholars agree that the state or similar authority structure is responsible for the
systematic planning and the ongoing attempt to eliminate a vulnerable, politically
and socially marginalized minority group of people. These people are singled out
for destruction because of their membership in a particular group. In addition,
scholars concur that the intent of genocide is the ultimate destruction of a group
of people, either culturally or physically. Lastly, Alverez concludes that scholars
recognize genocide as a crime that must be prevented and punished (Alverez
2001, 47-53).
Barbara Harffs definition of genocide and politicide is the framework for
this study and future studies utilizing the model advanced in this project. Harff
defines genocides and politicides in Peace and Conflict (2005) as:

3 Robert Melson (1992), Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990), Helen Fein (1992), and Israel
Charny (1994) all provide a definition of genocide that differs from that provided by the United
Nations.
5
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the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by
governing elites or their agents— or, in the case of civil war, either of the
contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a
communal, political, or politicized ethnic group (Harff 2005).
The commonalities found by Averez are included in Harffs definition. Harff
provides a concise description of the genocide in her definition. Her definition is
used in this project because of the inclusiveness of Alverez’s findings and its
applicability to further research.
This project examines elite perceptions and the adoption of an extremist
policy of genocide. The study chose to examine elites because elites hold power
and access to resources. Elites hold financial power and have the power to
influence and shape the media. Elites control the state and ultimately the elites
develop a policy of genocide utilizing the power they hold. The project addresses
two questions in an effort to understand how an extremist policy of genocide is
adopted. The two additional questions are:
1) What makes the ground ripe for genocide?
2) How do political elites come to view genocide as a viable policy solution?
This study is particularly relevant for social scientists. Understanding what
makes the ground ripe for genocide may facilitate the recognition of geographic
areas where genocide may be likely to occur. In addition, the examination of
elite perceptions and the adoption of a policy of genocide lends to the
scholarship currently circulating explaining causes of genocide. For the policy
community, the findings in this project may aid in the prevention of future
genocides, thereby possibly saving hundreds of thousands of innocent lives.

6
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Identifying precursors that may contribute to the development of a genocidal
policy may enable the de-escalation of an outbreak of genocide.
Primordialists and instrumentalists offer explanations for the outbreak of
violence between groups. Primordialists argue that innate differences account
for the violence that is witnessed. Instrumentalists argue that identities are
construed to serve political and economic objectives and can become
contentious. However, the primordialist explanation does not accurately account
for the horrors witnessed in the mass killings that have occurred in the 20th
century. The murder of half the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire in
1915; the murder of a quarter of the Ukrainian population in 1933; the murder of
half the population in Nanking in 1937; the murder of two-thirds of European
Jews during the Holocaust; the murder of half the Chinese population in
Cambodia in 1975; the murder of 50,000 to 200,000 Kurds in Iraq in 1988; the
murder of 200,000 Muslims in Bosnia in 1993-1994; and the murder of 800,000
Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 can be more accurately explained using an
instrumentalists understanding of the origins of conflict.
An examination of the differences between the primordial and instrumental
approaches to understanding ethnic conflict is necessary to address the
questions broached in this study. Primordialism is dismissed and instrumental
factors are explored. Glicks (2002) research on scapegoating is also examined
as evidence for the development of a genocidal policy. This study proposes a
model that examines the role economic and political crises, international
pressures and a polarized society may have on elite perceptions of threat. It is

7
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hypothesized that the perception of a threat may lead to the adoption of an
extremist policy of genocide.

Methods
This study uses a most similar system comparative case study to
qualitatively examine the Rwandan and Armenian cases of genocide. The
collection of information on the political environment and economic situation of
the cases prior to the genocides is gathered from historical documents,
journalistic accounts, and secondary sources.
According to Ragin (1987), the benefit of conducting a qualitative case
study allows the cases to be interpreted historically, and allows for the
examination of change in specific settings (Ragin 1987, x). There is a limitation
associated with this method, but the benefit of conducting an in-depth
examination of the events that occurred over time in each case outweighs the
fact that the findings are not applicable to a large number of cases. Further
research may be able to use the implications found in this study of the Armenian
and Rwandan case and use it to understand additional cases of genocide.
This study deliberately chose to examine the Armenian and Rwandan
cases because genocide occurred. In addition to choosing cases based on the
dependent variable, the cases were chosen because the antecedent variables
advanced in the model were present. The presence of economic and political
crises, international pressures, and a polarized society in both cases allowed for
specific focus on the relationship between elite perceptions and the influence
they play on the adoption of a genocidal policy. Selection bias occurs when

8
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cases are chosen based on having achieved the desired outcome, but the study
is able to determine what the Armenian and Rwandan cases have in common
(Geddes 1990,132). It would not be possible to determine whether the specific
antecedents are crucial unless one studies cases where genocide did not occur,
but the commonalities found in the Armenian and Rwandan cases may facilitate
an understanding of genocide that can be developed further.
Comparative social science aims to explain and interpret macrosocial
variation. Ragin provides an overview of comparative methodology. He writes:
comparativists are interested in identifying the similarities and differences
among macrosocial units. This knowledge provides the key to
understanding, explaining, and interpreting diverse historical outcomes and
processes and their significance for current institutional arrangements
(Ragin 1987, 5-6).

This study uses comparative methods to interpret a path genocidal policy
could take. Ragin notes that comparativists apply theory to cases in order to
interpret them (Ragin 1987,11). A model is presented in this study to examine
elite perceptions and the adoption of extremist genocidal policy.
The most apparent similarity is both the Armenians and Tutsis were
minorities in their respective populations. Both groups had also undergone some
polarization. In addition, radical extremist elites had assumed power only a short
time before the genocides occurred. This change in governance took the place
of an established government that had been in existence for a lengthy period of
time. Upon delving deeper into the cases it becomes apparent that the Rwandan
and Armenian cases are similar in that the antecedent variables in both cases

9
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closely resemble each other. Economic and political crises were present in both
Rwanda and the Ottoman Empire prior to the occurrence of genocide. In
addition, both the Ottoman Empire and Rwanda were under international
pressure to meet demands promoting the recognition of minority populations
within their state.
Table 1.
Similarities in Armenian and Rwandan Cases
Armenian Case

Rwandan Case

Minority Populations
Subject to Violence
Polarization

Armenians

Tutsi

British Influence

Belgian Influence

Presence of
Radical Extremists
Economic Crisis

Committee of Union
and Progress
Economic Collapse

Akazu
Economic Collapse

Political Crisis

Revolutionary Parties

Civil War

International Pressure

Treaty of Berlin

Arusha Accords

There are also differences apparent in the cases. There is a religious
dimension in the Armenian case. This religious dimension was not as clearly
apparent in the Rwandan case. In addition, the genocidal violence was
perpetrated differently. The Turks marched the Armenians into the desert.
Those that did not perish along the way were subjected to abuse and ultimately
murdered; whereas, the genocide in Rwanda occurred under the wrath of
machetes. Radical elites were able to successfully adopt a radical extremist
policy of genocide in an effort to deflect culpability and abate societal ills.
10
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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL DEBATE

Primordialism and instrumentalism frame the theoretical debate explaining
the occurrence of ethnic conflict. The primordialist approach suggests that
individuals coalesce because of the innate attachments they have formed with
each other (Geertz 1963,109). Instrumentalism suggests that identities are
construed to serve political or economic ends (Fenton 1999, 24; Harff and Gurr
2004, 96). Instrumental influences may play a role in the adoption of a radical,
extremist policy of genocide.

Primordialism/lnstrumentalism
Primordial attachments are the bonds by which groups form and associate
(Geertz 1963,109). According to Geertz (1963), the innate desire to develop an
attachment with people whom one shares a religion, a language, and social
practices with underlies the concept of primordial attachments (Geertz 1963,
109-110). Tribalism is an example of a primordialist explanation for the
occurrence of ethnic conflict. Tribalism is the belief that deep-rooted and ancient
hatreds that exist between groups inevitably explode into conflict.
Instrumentalism suggests that identities are construed to serve political or
economic ends (Fenton 1999, 24, Harff and Gurr 2004, 96). Identities may
become construed during polarization. An instrumental understanding of conflict

11
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suggests that individuals shift or alter their group association because it is
beneficial to do so (Jenkins 1997, 44-45). Instrumentalists often highlight one
component over another. Elites may see it as beneficial to polarize identities if
they perceive a threat to their political power. Elites generate reasons for ethnic
groups’ reasons to disassociate.
The instrumental argument explaining the occurrence of ethnic conflict
provides an more concrete explanation for conflict. Instrumentalism refutes
primordial scholar’s explanation of conflict as the result of innate attachments.
The work of Catherine Newbury (1988), WM. Roger Lewis (1979), Gerard
Prunier (1995) and Alain Destexhe (1994) negates tribal animosity as the sole
explanation for the ethnic violence that erupted in Rwanda. The work of
Newbury, an established scholar on Rwanda, suggests instrumental influences
provide a clearer explanation of the crises experienced in Rwanda.

Her text

provides evidence suggesting that the Hutu and Tutsi identities were first
polarized by the Belgian’s during colonial penetration. Destexhe posits that the
massacres prior to the genocide were not the result of deep-rooted and ancient
hatred between two ethnic groups. He provides evidence that the Hutu and Tutsi
cannot even correctly be described as ethnic groups. He acknowledges that
there were distinguishable social categories in existence before the arrival of
colonizers, but the differences were not based on ethnic or racial divisions. The
Hutu and Tutsi stereotypes were exaggerated by the Belgians. The Belgian
elevation of one group influenced the categorizing of ethnicity. Destexhe’s
research found that following independence in 1962 the political party in power

12
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played the ethnic card each time it searched for a way out of political difficulty.
Akazu, the radical political party that seized power after President Habyarimana’s
death, was able to play the ethnic card because of Belgium’s original polarization
of the Hutu-Tutsi identity (Destexhe 1994, 36).
Instrumental explanations for the occurrence of conflict between the Turks
and Armenians are also present in Armenian genocide literature. Renowned
scholars Ronald Suny (1993), Peter Balakian (2003), Donald Bloxham (2005),
Stephan Astorian (1990), and Rouben Adalian (2004), have conducted extensive
research on the Ottoman Empire and Armenian genocide. They present
evidence of instrumental influences on the outbreak of conflict in the Armenian
case. It has been noted that there was a religious divide between the Muslim
Turks and non-Muslim Armenians, but scholars agree that the Armenians and
Turks were able to co-exist for many years without the eruption of ethnic or
religious conflict. The religious divide was not the sole cause of the outbreak of
conflict in the Ottoman Empire. Bloxham’s research suggests an international
influence around the middle of the 1800’s challenged the subordinate and super
ordinate relationship that existed between the Muslim’s and non-Muslims in the
Ottoman Empire (Bloxham 2005,15).
The colonial experience in Rwanda and the Ottoman Empire polarized
relations between the minority and majority populations. Their advocating of
change between the minority and majority populations and the implemented
structural changes to the political status quo sparred conflict. The Belgians
instituted reforms to change the governing structure in Rwanda. The British

13
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introduced a treaty which advocated more equal treatment of the minorities
residing in the Ottoman Empire.
Precursors to Genocide
According to Benjamin Valentino (2004), explanations for the occurrence
of genocide are considered to fall into either the primordial or instrumental
theoretical categories in qualitative research or within an empirical model in
quantitative research. Valentino (2004) provides an overview of explanations
accounting for what causes genocide. According to Valentino, three broad
categories denote preconditions for the occurrence of genocide and mass killing.
These categories include: social cleavages, national crises, and the
concentration of political power in certain forms of government. Scholars who
suggest social cleavages as the precondition to the occurrence of genocide focus
on the presence of deep divisions between different groups living in the same
society. They understand conflict to be initiated because of those divisions within
society (Valentino 2004,17). Deep divisions can include religious and ethnic
cleavages. This first category shares the theoretical underpinning of
primordialism.
According to Valentino, scapegoat theory and political opportunity theory,
referenced in association with national crises, denotes the second category of
literature explaining the occurrence of genocide. The scapegoat theory suggests
that the psychological effects of national crises trigger genocide. Generally
speaking, scapegoat theory is the blaming of a specific group for societal ills.
The political opportunity theory suggests that opportunities and incentives for

14
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mass killing are generated by national crises (Valentino 2004, 22). This second
category shares instrumental assumptions. Identities are ultimately construed to
serve political and economic interests.
The third category of literature found by Valentino suggests the
concentration of political power in certain forms of government leads to genocide
(Valentino 2004,16). It is hypothesized that democratic institutions are less likely
to engage in genocide than autocratic regimes4. R.J. Rummel (1995) and
Mathew Krain (1997) advance arguments based on the theory that power is a
precondition of genocide. This third common category introduces quantitative
literature. Quantitative studies develop empirical models that assess the
likelihood of genocide occurring. These studies introduce risk assessment and
early warning models for the occurrence of genocide and politicide5 (Gurr and
Moore 1997; Harff and Gurr 1998).
Harff and Gurr (1998) lead the study and development of empirical models
that assess countries at risk for genocide. HarfFs study (2003) looks at which
factors distinguish episodes that lead to genocide and politicide from those
episodes that do not. The results of her study conclude that:
the optimal model identifies six preconditions of genocide and politicide that
make it possible, using the case-control procedure and logic regression, to

4 Harff (2003) defines an autocratic regime: “In autocracies citizens’ participation is sharply
restricted; chief executives are selected within the political elite; and, once in office chief
executives exercise power with few or no institutional constraints” (63).
5 Harff differentiates between genocide and politicide in terms of how the groups are victimized.
Victimized groups defined by their perpetrators in terms of their political opposition to the regime
risk politicide. Groups defined by communal characteristics risk genocide (Harff 2003, 58).
15
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postdict accurately 74% of episodes that began between 1955 and the late
1990s6 (Harff 2003, 57).
The six factors in the optimal model include: political upheaval, prior genocides,
elite ideology, regime type, ethnic and religious cleavages, and international
interdependences. Use of HarfFs model to assess risks of future genocides and
politicides suggests that:
The risk factors include the extent of political upheaval and the occurrence
of prior geno-/politicides. The probability of mass murder is highest under
autocratic regimes, and is most likely to be set in motion by elites who
advocate an exclusionary ideology, or represent an ethnic minority, or both.
International economic interdependences sharply reduce the chances that
internal war and regime instability will have genocidal consequences (Harff
2003, 70).

Harff provides a quantitatively based approach to signaling possible
genocides. Her goal is that “anticipatory responses should save more lives at
less cost than belated responses after the killing has begun” (Harff 2003, 72).
Harffs model predicts with 76% accuracy the 36 serious civil conflicts that led to
episodes of genocidal violence between 1955 and 2004 and the 93 other cases
that did not (Harff 2005).
A seventh factor was also suggested by Harff in Peace and Conflict
(2005): severe political and economic discrimination. Six of the seven risk factors
at the time of the 2005 Peace and Conflict publication were present in Sudan.
The presence of these risk factors indicates that Sudan tops the list of countries

6 Quantitative studies of genocide and politicide usually compile and analyze data from 1955 on.
Harff provides an explanation for the 1955 starting point: “Most episodes [genocides and
politicides] in the late 1940s and early 1950s were continuations of prior conflicts... As a
consequence of decolonization, many new, conflict prone states entered the international system
beginning in the 1950s, and as a practical matter, reliable data for most independent variables
were sparse or nonexistent before then” (Harff 2003, 59).
16
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at high risk for possible genocide (Harff 2005, 64). Harff concludes that
systematic risk assessment cannot identify when genocidal violence is likely to
begin, but is capable of suggesting that a country is in the latter stages of
upheaval which may result in genocidal behavior (Harff 2005).
This study takes into account the differing scholarly explanations for the
occurrence of ethnic conflict and mass killing. The project explores how the
perception of a threat to elites in power influences the formation of a genocidal
agenda. It examines whether the presence of economic and political crises,
international pressures, and a polarized society seems to induce the perception
of a threat to elite power.

Scapegoating
This study suggests that the occurrence of scapegoating is evidence that
extremist genocidal violence may be occurring. Peter Glick’s (2002) work is
utilized in this study to understand the psychological and sociological construct:
scapegoating. Scapegoating is defined as: “the venting of frustrations on an
innocent but weak target” (Glick 2002,113). Glick (2002) develops a model to
address the deficiencies of scapegoat theory in previous research, and searches
for an answer to why the Nazi party chose to enact a policy of genocide on the
Jews.
Glick presents an ideological model of scapegoating. Scapegoating
ideologies blame shared frustrations on a specific group of people (Glick 2002,
114). Scapegoating ideologies are adopted when they offer a psychologically
and socially attractive explanation and course of action designed to remove the
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frustrating conditions a population is experiencing (Glick 2002,114). Glick
suggests that widespread economic and social frustrations motivate people to
seek plausible causal explanations at a collective level (Glick 2002,114).
Glick proposes that a crucial mediator of scapegoating is an ideology of
envious prejudice (Glick 2002,115). Envious prejudice occurs when a group
thinks another has dangerous or evil intentions (Glick 2002,115). Glick notes
that the targeted group is perceived to have the ability to in fact create the
problems being experienced and has a valid reason to cause the problems (Glick
2002,129). Glick explains how targeted groups are chosen. Targeted groups
are those groups that have the ability to influence the economy and society or
those groups that intend to do harm. Targets of envious prejudice are those
viewed as intentionally causing economic and social problems (Glick 2002,130).
Envious prejudices are most acute when majority group members feel that their
social status has shifted downward relative to the status of the minority (Glick
2002, 130).
Glick’s ideological model suggests that scapegoating occurs under a
specific set of conditions. According to Glick, the conditions conducive to
scapegoating occur when “the causes of widespread economic or social
frustrations can plausibly, in the minds of those affected, be blamed on a
particular social group” (Glick 2002,139). He notes that his ideological
scapegoating model fits the genocidal attack of the Armenians and the Tutsis
(Glick 2002,139). For the purposes of this study, scapegoating is indicative of a
genocidal agenda because the perception of a threat to elite power seems to
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initiate the deflection of culpability for societal ills and influence the adoption of a
genocidal agenda.

Model
Instrumental influences contributed to the outbreak of conflict in Rwanda
and Armenia. The model presented below suggests four independent variables
that may collectively weigh in on elite’s perception that their power is being
threatened. The collective presence of a polarized society, economic crisis,
political crisis and international pressures may threaten elites holding power
within a state. The perception that their power is being threatened may instigate
the formation of a policy of genocide. Scapegoating deflects culpability for the
crises away from the elites in power and is evidence that a genocidal policy may
have been set in motion. This deflection of culpability serves as a means to
retain political power. Furthermore, a policy of genocide becomes legitimized as
scapegoating ideologies are advanced and people begin to view those being
scapegoated as the culprits responsible for societal and economic ills. A policy
of genocide becomes a viable solution. Figure 1 presents a depiction of the
factors that elites may perceive to threaten their power. Collectively, those
variables and the perception of a threat may lead to the adoption of a genocidal
policy.
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Theory

Dependent!
Variable j

Independer
Variables

Polarized Society

Perceived
Threat
to Elite
Power

Economic Crisis
(Societal Frustration)

Extremist/
Genocidal
Agenda
(evidenced by
scapegoating)

Political Crisis
(Pressure to Powershare)
International Pressures
Figure 1. Proposed Model

This project explores each of the independent variables. The study
examines whether each independent variable was present in each case. In
addition, the study illustrates that collectively the independent variables could
have influenced elite perception of a threat to their political power. It finds that
the perceived threat to their power resulted in the advancement of an extremist
genocidal agenda. The adoption of an extremist genocidal agenda is measured
by the scapegoating rhetoric that occurred in both cases.
A polarized society is defined as a society that has been broken up into
opposing factions or groups. An understanding of economic crisis is borrowed
from Helen Hintjens definition of economic crises (Hintjens 1999, 242).
Economic crises are indicated by economic recession or collapse, external debt,
and the collapse of state welfare policies. An understanding of what denotes
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political crisis is developed by borrowing Harffs (2003) concept of political
upheaval. Political crises include defeat in war, revolutions, coups, and regime
transitions that result in the acquisition of political power to a group or individual
who embraces extremist ideologies (Harff 2003, 62). The study borrows
concepts from the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
to define extremists (2005). Extremists can be defined as individuals who
advocate an ideology of political change that advocates condones or even
implies violence. International pressure is defined as pressure exerted by
legitimate international actors who collectively seek change for the repressive
domestic situation within a country.
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CHAPTER II

RWANDA

The genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 may be considered one of
the world’s most tragic events since the Second World War. United Nation’s
estimates suggest that approximately one million people perished during the
genocide, and more than twenty five percent of the Rwandan population became
displaced between April and August (United Nations and Rwanda 1996, 4).

Political Environment
The violent conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda is commonly
referenced as ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ conflict. Primordialists understand the violence
between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda as tribal. This section attempts to
establish that the primordialist perspective of conflict is weak and does not
account for the ethnic violence that has occurred. In this section the presence of
instrumental factors on the Hutu/Tutsi identity is substantiated. It seems likely
that instrumental influences weighed in on the development of a policy of
genocide in Rwanda in 1994. This study relies on the work of Newbury (1988),
Destexhe (1994), Louis (1979) and Prunier (1995) to provide a historical
overview of the Tutsi and Hutu identity.
The Hutus are the original inhibitors of Rwanda. They were primarily
engaged in agricultural production. Around the 15th century the Tutsis slowly
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migrated into western Rwanda from the East, eventually accounting for 10
percent of the population. The Hutus constituted 86 percent of the population.7
The Tutsi acquired the Hutu language, shared their religion, and followed similar
traditions (Louis 1979,108; Destexhe 1995, 37). The difference between the
Hutu and Tutsi was essentially their occupation. The Hutus were agriculturalists.
The Tutsis were breeders of long horned cattle.
The movement of the Tutsi population into Rwanda is generally regarded
as a peaceful process. During this early pre-colonial period the Tutsis dominated
Rwandan politics. The Tutsis dominated the political arena because of the value
that was associated with owning cattle.8 Cattle and wealth were synonymous.
Those that breed cattle were considered more influential. Having cattle
enhanced opportunity for political and social elevation. In order for a Hutu to
obtain cattle, and elevate socially and politically, they were required to perform
services for the Tutsi. A cattle agreement between the Hutu and the Tutsi in
Rwanda, referred to as ubuhake, enabled the Hutu to acquire cattle and move
toward Tutsi status. Ubuhake required that Hutus be loyal to the Tutsis granting
the cattle. Ubuhake also included provisions such as: Tutsi cattle being allowed
to use Hutu land; sharing of Hutu crops with Tutsis; and a guarantee that the
Hutu would provide military protection to the Tutsi. Ubuhake was a mutually

7 These numbers are representative of the Rwandan population just prior to Belgian control in
1916. The Twa were an ethnic group but were thought to make up only one percent of the
population. Due to the small percentage of Twa in the total population, and the insignificant role
they are believed to have played in the region, the group is not addressed in this study (Destexhe
1995, 37).
8 The extent to which the Tutsi dominated the Hutu pre-colonization varied by region.
23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

benefiting, contractual relationship. The Tutsi provided protection to the Hutu as
well (Louis 1963,110). Ubuhake and the similarities in Hutu and Tutsi language
and religion illustrate that ethnicity played a relatively non-existent role in the
social fabric of Rwanda’s pre-colonial society. Primordialism cannot account for
the conflict that erupted in Rwanda in 1994.
The outbreak of ethnic conflict in Rwanda can be explained via
instrumentalism. The German and Belgian involvement in Rwanda ultimately
manipulated the relationship between the minority and majority groups. An
analysis of the reforms instituted by the Belgians concludes that the Belgians
were most influential in polarizing the Hutu/Tutsi identity, thereby making the
ground ripe for conflict. The Belgians were not the first to occupy Rwanda
though. The first Europeans arrived in the Great Lakes Region in 1892. The
territory of contemporary Rwanda was included within German East Africa by
1894. In 1914, the Germans physically ventured into Rwanda. The German
government allied with the Tutsi Monarchy, increasing Tutsi power internally.
German indirect rule created a power discrepancy in favor of the Tutsi. This
power differential began the polarization process of the Hutu/Tutsi identity. The
Tutsi’s had access to power and resources because of their position on the
political spectrum. The Germans had only a small presence in Rwanda
(Destexhe 1995,40). Their light administrative implementation could not have
modified the Rwandese society in depth (Prunier 1995, 25). The German
colonizers certainly influenced the Hutu/Tutsi dynamics, but the real changes
came during Belgian colonial involvement.
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The Belgians entered Rwanda after the Germans. During Belgian
penetration, polarization of the Hutu/Tutsi identity is witnessed most. The
Belgian presence in Rwanda was longer and more influential than the German
stint. In 1916, Belgium officially occupied Rwanda. In 1919, the League of
Nations sanctioned the colonial relationship. Throughout the 1920’s, Belgian
colonial over-lordship was recognized by the League of Nations. Following
World War II, Rwanda was administered as a Belgian Trust Territory under the
United Nations. During Belgian colonization, the Belgians became actively
involved in the political, social, and economic structures of Rwanda’s society.
Their involvement resulted in a significant change to ubuhake.
The administrative reorganization that occurred in Rwanda under Belgian
colonial over-lordship significantly influenced the relationship between the Hutu
and the Tutsi.

The reorganization began in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s

under the Belgian policy known as les reforms Voisin. The central measure of
these reforms was the transfer of all chiefly function to a single hand (Prunier
1995, 27).

The Belgians placed all political power in the hands of the Tutsi.

Belgian governor Charles Voisin was able to transfer power by slowly replacing
the Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs with Tutsis. The transfer of power resulted in
political domination of the Hutu by the Tutsi.
The Tutsis bore responsibility for carrying out Belgian policies. The Tutsi
sub-chiefs carried out policies such as taxation, imposing cultivation of obligatory
crops, forced labor, and recruitment of workers for the Europeans. In addition to
fulfilling the Belgian policies, the chiefs also imposed “traditional” obligations on
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their subjects.

These traditional obligations existed under ubuhake.

The

obligations included the sharing of Hutu land for Tutsi cattle grazing, and the
production of Hutu crops for the use of the Tutsis.

The extensive demands

experienced by rural dwellers in Rwanda, and the closing of appeal channels
resulted in a powerless situation for the Hutu. Gerald Prunier (1995) describes
the consequences of the Belgian reforms in Rwanda: “The Belgian reforms of
1926-31 had created a modern Rwanda: centralized, efficient, neo-traditionalist
and catholic, but also brutal” (Prunier 1995, 35).
Social and political restructuring in Rwanda standardized and
institutionalized a hierarchical relationship between the Tutsi and Hutu. The
Belgians used the Tutsi elites as administrative puppets to install a hierarchical
structure of political authority. The Hutus were deprived of political power and
were exploited by the Tutsis and white colonizers. The implementation of the
Belgian reforms resulted in the Tutsi believing they were a superior race.
Ultimately, the restructuring and the implementation of reforms polarized the
Hutu and Tutsi identity.
Ubuhake ceased to exist following Belgian colonization. At the conclusion
of Belgian colonial rule the Belgians solidified polarization of the Hutu and Tutsi
identity by distributing identification cards. The mere distribution of identity cards
indicates that the differences between the Hutus and Tutsis were not pronounced
enough to be able to determine ones ethnicity by looks alone. The identification
cards did not denote ethnicity though; rather, they indicated the amount of cattle
an individual owned. One who owned ten or more cows were classified as a
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Tutsi, and those with less than ten cows were classified as a Hutu (Alex de Waal
1994, 2). These cards identified the Tutsis from the Hutus based on the amount
of cattle one owned.
As the Belgians withdrew from Rwanda and prepared to grant Rwanda
independence the Hutus and Tutsis perpetrated violence against one another for
succession of the throne. Four parties succeeded in mobilizing significant
followings. Two parties were considered Tutsi. The first Tutsi party, the Union
Nationale Rwandaise (Unar) was Monarchist and sought to preserve Tutsi
hegemony. The second Tutsi party, the Rassemblement Democratique
Rwandaise (Rader), was a moderate progressive party calling for the
democratization of institutions and a constitutional monarchy. The two
predominately Hutu parties were the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la
Masse (Aprosoma) and the Parti du Mouvement de (’Emancipation Hutu
(Parmehutu).9 Aprosoma consisted of populist oriented leaders demanding
social progress for oppressed groups in Rwanda, welcoming poor Tutsi as well
as Hutu. Parmehutu was a militaristic anti-Tutsi group demanding the
improvement of the Hutu status.
The mere existence of these four parties and their philosophy at the time
of independence illustrates polarization occurred during Belgian colonization.
The discrimination felt by the Hutu during Belgian colonial rule instigated
retaliation against the Tutsi at the time of independence.10 The violent

9 MSM was converted into PARMEHUTU in 1959.
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encounters between the Hutu and Tutsi resulted in thousands of Tutsi fleeing
Rwanda, and an overthrow of the monarchy. Political power was relegated to the
Hutus.

Economic Crisis
The presence of economic crisis prior to the outbreak of genocide is an
important precursor. Economic crisis produces anxiety among a population.
There is no doubt that Rwanda was in a state of economic crisis prior to the
occurrence of genocide in 1994. Rwanda’s staple export on the international
market plummeted, structural adjustment policies (SAP’s) imposed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were implemented, and
agricultural and food production collapsed. These events plunged Rwanda into
severe economic crisis.
A state of economic crisis did not always exist in Rwanda. Prior to the late
1980’s, the Rwandans were considered well off in comparison to others in the
region. Hintjens finds that prior to the mid 1980’s, Rwanda’s government
managed to avoid becoming heavily indebted. The economy was also relatively
well managed, money was stable and levels of inflation, foreign debt and
corruption remained low (Hintjens 1999, 256). In addition, Rwanda provided its
citizens with access to drinking water, electricity, primary education, and basic
health care.
The progressive economic situation in Rwanda began to deteriorate as
international coffee prices fell in the late 1980’s. Coffee was Rwanda’s key

10 Rwanda was granted independence July 1,1962.
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export. The exportation of coffee accounted for 75% of the export earning in
Rwanda (Keane 1995, 22). The recession was exacerbated by stagnated food
production between the years of 1985 and 1990.
To illustrate the decrease in food production, Peter Uvin notes that
Rwandan farmers Kcal production decreased from 2,055 Kcal per person per day
in 1984 to 1,509 Kcal in 1991. Although the production of cash crops during the
same period slowly increased, the outbreak of civil war closed essential trade
routes beginning in 1991 displacing farmers responsible for the production of
food and agricultural export (Uvin 1998, 54). In 1993, Rwanda’s food production
totally collapsed. Food had to be imported and famine increased exponentially.
The increase in food imports and the devaluation of currency resulted in a trade
gap which produced export revenue barely covering one third of the import bill
(Hintjens 1999, 258). The economic crisis forced Rwanda to accumulate
external debt and challenged the existing re-distributional welfare polices that
had enhanced the quality of life for many Rwandans.
In 1991 Rwanda signed a $90 million structural adjustment program with
the World Bank. The cornerstone of the policy was the devaluation of currency.
The implementation of the SAP’s resulted in the devaluation of Rwandan
currency by 40% in November of 1990, and an additional 15% in June of 1992.
The consequence of the devaluation included inflation rising from 1% in 1989 to
19.2% in 1991 (Uvin 1998, 58). The effect of the SAP’s administered by the IMF
and the World Bank is controversial. SAP’s imposed by the World Bank and the
IMF, as Villa Jefremovas sees them, contributed to the impoverishment of a large
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part of Rwanda’s peasantry and ultimately devastated the entire Rwandan
population (Jefremovas 1995, 29).
To be fair to the World Bank and the IMF, the SAP’s were not intended to
be applied to a region in the throes of civil war. Rwanda’s implementation of the
SAP’s was also spotty. Two main areas that would have facilitated an
improvement in the economic condition of the state included managing the size
of the state and its degree of intervention in the economy. These two areas were
ignored. The size of the state and its degree of intervention was hardly reduced
(Uvin 1998, 59). Uvin notes the devastating effects of the SAP’s: “the loans did
not pull Rwanda out of its economic crisis. By 1993 Rwanda’s debt as a
percentage of GNP had skyrocketed from 32% in 1990 to 62%” (Uvin 1998, 59).
In addition, resources were being applied to the civil war effort in an attempt to
combat the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) penetrating Rwanda. As the result of a
10% increase in participation in the Rwandan Army military expenditures in 1993
rose to 7.6% of GNP compared to only 1.6% of GNP between 1985 and 1990.
Conditions within Rwanda deteriorated with the economic recession and Rwanda
ventured further down a path of destitution.

Political Crisis
A series of political crises occurred as economic conditions deteriorated in
Rwanda. A rise in political discontent between the Northern and Southern Hutu
within Rwanda developed as the economy collapsed, a civil war broke out in
1990, and the international community pushed Rwanda to democratize.
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When Rwanda achieved independence in 1962, Hutu rulers targeted
Tutsis. Thousands of Tutsis fled to bordering countries to escape the wrath of
violence. Throughout the early 1960’s Tutsi’s fought to return to power in
Rwanda, but the Hutu’s proved horrifically successful in deterring Tutsi attacks.
“From 1959-1967, some 20,000 Tutsi were killed and another 200,000 Tutsi—
half their population in Rwanda at the time—were driven from the country as
refugees” (Kuperman 2004, 63). The refugees coalesced and decades later
formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
The RPF was active beginning is 1979 under the name the Rwandan
Alliance for National Unity (RANU). RANU sought return to Rwanda and were
aligned with Ugandan’s Museveni guerrilla warfare rebel movement (Kuperman
2904, 65). The RPF was established following Rwandan President
Habyarimana’s formal ban in 1986 on the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda.
The RPF was established in December of 1987. In 1988 Ugandan President
Museveni attempted to persuade Habyarimana to allow Tutsi refugees back into
Rwanda. The RPF wanted more than what Museveni was trying to negotiate.
They wanted the removal of Habyarimana from power and a significant share of
political power in Rwanda (Kuperman 2004, 68).
Musevini proved unable to negotiate the wants of the RPF. The RPF
invaded Rwanda in October of 1990. Habyarimana responded with a counter
attack and a military crackdown on Rwandan civilians accused of supporting the
rebel force. Habyarimana detained 10-15,000 Rwandese accused of supporting
the RPF. Throughout the early 1990’s Habyarimana proved fickle in his relations
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with the RPF. He attempted to make concessions with the RPF signing a
declaration on the right of refugee return in February of 1991. In April 1992,
Habyarimana installed a multi-party government but retained effective control of
the government (Kuperman 2004, 72). Unsatisfied with Habyarimana’s efforts
the RPF continued to penetrate Rwanda with offensive attacks.
The international community began to pressure Habyarimana to solidify a
peace agreement and end the civil war perpetuating in Rwanda. Pressured by
the international community, Habyarimana signed the Arusha Accords in August
of 1993. The signing of the Arusha Accords promoted both a peace agreement
and introduced a transitional government. The peace agreement clause sought
an end to the civil war playing out in Rwanda. The introduction of a transitional
government aimed at acquiescing multi-party elections and integrating the RPF
into the Rwandan Army. The dissatisfaction felt by the RPF regarding
Habyarimana’s signature on the Arusha Accords was shared by the Movement
Republican National for Development (MRND) and the Coalition for the Defense
of the Republic (GDR). MRND and GDR viewed President Habyarimana’s
signature as an act of betrayal. His agreement to the Accords was viewed as an
act of betrayal because the President’s own hard-line inner circle, Akazu, was
unwilling to negotiate any end to the war that would accommodate the Tutsi
(Peterson 2Q00, 272).

Elite Response
Two Hutu parties increasingly promoted a racist ideology through the early
199Q’s: a wing of the Movement Republican National for Development (MRND),
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the only party to have held power since independence, and the Coalition for the
Defense of the Republic (CDR). Human Rights Watch concludes that “this
genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of a modern elite to foster hatred
and fear to keep itself in power” (Human Rights Watch 1999,1).
The genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus is thought to have been
devised within Akazu, the close circle of elites surrounding President Juvenal
Habyarimana (Destexhe 1994, 28). Akazu illustrates the presence of radical
extremist elites within the government structure. Economic and political crises
within Rwanda perpetuated the need for regime survival. Hutus were unwilling to
share political power. Akazu, the hard-line inner circle surrounding
Habyarimana, felt Habyarimana was jeopardizing the power held by the Hutus
and began to circulate their own policies. From 1990 on, it is thought that with
the active complicity of Habyarimana and Akazu massacres of Tutsi’s increased
and went unpunished, eventually leading to full scale genocide in 1994
(Destexhe 1994, 28).

Findings
Scapegoating the evils of colonization to the Tutsi allowed the Hutu to
blame other ills experienced in Rwanda to the Tutsi. Contentious cleavages
between the Hutu and the Tutsi were slowly absorbed by the Rwandese during
colonization. The polarized identities were reinvigorated by radical extremists,
Akazu, within the Rwandan government. Scapegoating was used to polarize
Hutu and Tutsi relations prior to the genocide.
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Utilizing the model advanced in this paper, it can be hypothesized that
Akazu recognized that as economic and political crises unraveled within the
country Hutu power could more easily be challenged. To avoid losing political
power, blame for the economic and political crises were placed on the Tutsi. The
crises were scapegoated to the minority population. Habyarimana and Akazu
blamed the Tutsis for societal ills. They referenced the jobs held by Tutsis as
those capable of propelling Rwanda into economic crisis. Habyarimana
suggested that a conspiracy of traders, merchants, and intellectuals, professions
held by a Tutsi majority were responsible for the deteriorating economic condition
(Hintjens 1999, 256).
Propagandists, such as Kangura and Hate Radio incited hatred for the
Tutsi by referencing the economic crisis. The Tutsi were propagated as wealthy.
The Hutu were propagated as poor. The Hutu were propagated as experiencing
the more adverse conditions associated with the economic decline.
Propagandists suggested that the elevated economic situation of the Tutsi could
be attributed to their educational advantages and the fact that they were
employed in jobs Hutus should hold. Propagandists instructed hatred and fear
for the Tutsi. Human Rights Watch documented the propaganda spread to elicit
such hatred and fear.
The propagandists said the Tutsi had infiltrated economy,-at one point
Kangura11 claimed that 70 percent of the rich in Rwanda were Tutsi—
monopolized credit at the banks, and won a disproportionate share of the
highly coveted import and export licenses. In a clear effort to divert the
resentment otherwise directed at towards Hutu from Habyarimana’s region,

11 newspaper
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propagandists argued that it was Tutsi, not other Hutu, who occupied the
jobs which Southern Hutu wanted and failed to get. They also accused the
Tutsi of having taken a disproportionate share of places in secondary school
and university and, because of their educational advantages, of having
dominated the professions and government (Human Rights Watch 1999,
74).
According to Keane’s journalistic account of the situation in Rwanda, extremists
told Hutu peasants that the Tutsis were also coming to seize their land (Keane
1995, 23).
Another method by which propagandists were able to invoke hatred for the
Tutsi included playing on the fears of past Tutsi political domination. The
revolution of 1959 had freed the Hutu from the throes of Tutsi political power.
The Hutu were fearful of a return to Tutsi rule. Propagandists reminded Hutus
that should the Tutsis win the civil war playing out in Rwanda, “they [the Tutsi]
would not just reverse all the political changes of the revolution but also reclaim
all the property that had once been theirs, leaving many Hutu destitute” (Human
Rights Watch 1999, 78). The Hutu, experiencing the adverse effects of severe
economic crisis and uncertainty of their political future, could have begun to view
genocide of the Tutsi as a viable solution to abating societal ills.
Uvin notes that people are more apt to view radical solutions as viable
under economic stress: “For many people, hatred of the other served to combat
the low self-esteem caused by chronic unemployment and squelched aspirations;
these young, frustrated men were the ones most vulnerable to the kind of ethnic
appeals that led to genocide” ( Uvin 1998,137). The Hutu population was served
propaganda instructing them to believe that Tutsi domination would further
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deteriorate their already destitute situation. A solution to their destitute situation
could be found in taking Tutsi land and assets. According to Human Rights
Watch, 86 percent of the population was living in poverty at the time of the
genocide; this figure was the highest percentage in the world (Human Rights
Watch 1999, 261). The appeal for genocide was initiated within the radical
extremists surrounding the Habyarimana, Akazu. The destitute situation of the
Hutu in Rwanda in 1994 enabled extremists to convince the population that
genocide was a viable policy choice for abating societal ills.
Pressure from international actors for democratization threatened to
deprive Habyarimana and his regime of the power they utilized to control the
state. In an attempt to secure political power, ethnicity became a political tool of
the radical extremists. Ethnic hatred was used as a tool to unite a large majority
of the population around the Hutu government (Uvin 1998, 53). The Tutsi
became scapegoats for the political upheaval felt within Rwanda. The radical
extremists successfully invoked animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi. The
radical elites established an artificial link between the rebel Tutsi force trying to
gain access to political power in Rwanda, the RPF, and the general Tutsi
population. Propagandists instructed by Akazu often used the terms Tutsi and
RPF interchangeably (Human Rights Watch 1999, 74). The RPF, and by
extension all Tutsi’s, were also blamed by Akazu for the murder of President
Habyarimana when his plane was shot out of the sky just prior to the outbreak of
the 1994 genocide (Keane 1995, 28).
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CHAPTER III

ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

On the nights of April 24th and 25th, 1915, several hundred Armenian
political, financial and intellectual leaders were arrested in Constantinople,
deported to Anatolia, and murdered. This event is recognized as the official
beginning of the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians residing in the
Ottoman Empire (Adalian 2004, 53). Over the spring, summer and fall months of
1915 scholars and journalists estimate that between 800,000 and 1 million
Armenians died (Balakian 2003,179).

Ultimately, the genocide cost Armenians

residing in the Ottoman Empire over half their population (Astourian 1990,113114).
The Armenian genocide had its origins in the aspirations of the dictatorial
triumvirate belonging to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).12 Enver
was Minister of War. Talaat was Minister of the Interior. Jemal was Minister of
the Navy and military governor of Syria. In 1913, Enver, Jemal and Talaat
seized the government in a coup and ruled the empire with a Turkish nationalist
ideology for the following five years. Adalian (2004) illustrates the policy of the
triumvirate in August of 1914, at the brink of World War I: “The CUP had become

12 The Committee of Union and Progress was known in the West as the Young Turks (Adalian
2004, 54).
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a dictatorial, xenophobic, intolerant clique intent on pursuing a policy of racial
exclusivity (Adalian 2004, 54).
The Young Turks had originally advocated constitutionalism,
egalitarianism, and liberalism (Adalian 2004, 54). Deep economic and political
crisis and the near destruction of the hierarchical social structure in the Ottoman
Empire radicalized the original liberal Ottomanist views of the Young Turks.13
Adalian comments on the unraveling of a policy of genocide in the Ottoman
Empire: “The Ottoman leaders decided that the only way to save the Turkish
state was to reduce the Christian population” (Adalian 2004, 53). A genocidal
policy was viewed by political elites and the population as a viable solution
toward the eradication of societal ills (Suny 1993,108).
It is important to note the connotation of the term “deportation.” For the
purposes of this project, deportation refers to acts of massacre. This
connotation is found in Peter Balakian’s work (Balakian 2003, 335). Deportation
as massacre is illustrated through the acts that occurred during the ‘deportation’
of the Armenian provinces, cities, and villages beginning in April of 1915 and
continuing through the fall. First of all, the deportations were not an orderly
relocation process (Adalian 2004, 56). According to the research of Rouben
Adalian, the Ottoman government made no attempt to provide food or housing to
the deportees. The deportations were intended to expose the Armenians to

13 Prior to World War I, the Ottoman Empire experienced a series of political and military defeats.
The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austro-Hungary in 1908, the subsequent declaration of
independence by Bulgaria, the merger of Crete with Greece, revolts in Albania between 1910 and
1912, losses to Italy in Libya (1911), and in the course of two Balkan wars (1912-1913) the
diminution of Ottoman territory in Europe and the forced migration of Turks from Europe into
Anatolia (Suny 1993,108).
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abuses consisting of thievery, random butchery, rape, and kidnapping. The
authorities made no attempt to protect the deportees; rather, they went to great
lengths to ensure the deportees perished before reaching the final destination in
the Syrian Desert (Adalian 2004, 56).
The initial stage of deportation involved the immediate killing of men and
teenage males. Women and children were forced to march for weeks to a
dispatching center located in Aleppo. The women and children were starved,
beaten, and forced to march without clothing. Upon arrival in Aleppo those that
had endured the journey were deported to desert encampments in the
Mesopotamian and Syrian deserts. Adalian provides horrific statistics regarding
the survival rate of those forced to march: “Only a quarter of all deportees
survived the hundreds of miles, and weeks of walking” (Adalian 2004, 56).
Those who made it to the Syrian Desert encampments were expected to die from
food and water deprivation. Adalian also provides an account of the horror that
occurred upon reaching the Syrian Desert: “In this final carnage, children were
smashed against rocks, women were torn apart with swords, men were
mutilated, and others were thrown into flames alive (Adalian 2004, 57).
Deportation involved more than what Webster’s dictionary defines as an act or
instance of carrying or sending out of a country. The deportation of Armenians
denotes massacre; a slow death that lasted weeks finally ending with the
collapse of their bodies from abuse and neglect.
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Political Environment
Instrumental factors influenced the adoption of an extremist policy of
genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. An overview of the relationship
between the Muslim Ottomans and the non-Muslim subjects illustrates that the
identities were eventually polarized, but had co-existed under the millet system
for centuries.
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Ottoman tribes overran the
cradles of modern civilization. They conquered vast geographic areas with
military genius. Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to Constantinople
prior to the genocide, provides an impressive description of the accumulation of
land and people by the Ottomans:
[The Ottoman’s] swept from the plains of Central Asia and, like a whirlwind,
overwhelmed the nations of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor; it conquered
Egypt, Arabia, and practically all of northern Africa and then poured into
Europe, crushed the Balkan nations, occupied a large part of Hungary, and
even established the outposts of the Ottoman Empire in the southern parts
of Russia (Morgenthau 1919, 277-78).
Vast accumulations of territory also meant the accumulation of large populations
of people. A subordinate relationship was imposed on the conquered nonMuslims (Adalian 2004, 53). The divide was influenced by religion because
Ottoman common law was based on Islamic doctrine
The Muslims’ belonged to the Umma, the politically organized community
of believers and were recognized as having a higher status, that of over-lordship;
the non-Muslims were relegated a lower status, that of infidels (Dadrian 1995, 5).
Despite the super-ordinate - subordinate relationship between the Muslim Turks
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and Catholic Armenians their relationship between 1453 to 1878 is characterized
as a period of “benign symbiosis” (Suny 1993, 101). In fact, Armenians came to
be known as the loyal millet (Suny 1993,101). The non-Muslim Armenians and
Muslim Turks were able to coexist despite the existence of the superior and
subservient relationship. It can be argued that Muslim Turks and non-Muslim
Armenian identities were construed and polarized by international influences and
were subjected to further polarization under the CUP’s policy of Turkish
nationalism.

International Pressures
The Tanzimat era greatly influenced the relationship between the Muslims
and non-Muslims within the Empire. In the 1850’s the British advocated changes
to the hierarchical relationship between the Muslims and non-Muslims by
introducing a Protestant millet. In addition, the Treaty of Berlin advocated more
equal treatment for minorities within the Empire as states within the Empire
fought for independence. The treaty, influenced by international actors, was
drawn up following the Tanzimat era and the introduction of the Protestant millet.
The Berlin Treaty may have been perceived by elites as threatening to their
retention of political power.
During the 1800’s, the era of Tanzimat significantly introduced reform
within the Ottoman Empire. Tanzimat called for equality among all Ottoman
subjects and an end to the discrimination against non-Muslims (Suny 1993, 25).14

14 According to Bioxham, the decree of Tanzimat in 1856 known as the Hatti Humayun was a
restatement of the values of the 1839 Hatti Serif of Gulhane Tanzimat decree. The main
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The period of Tanzimat introduced Armenians to the idea that the state should
not discriminate against minority groups and that Muslims and non-Muslim
subjects could co-exist in a relationship of equality. During Tanzimat, a change
in the hierarchical societal structure was broached. Bioxham notes that the
Ottoman Empire embarked on the Tanzimat reform movement in an effort to
retain support from the Great Powers and to balance Russian interference.
Although sincere in their general intent, much of the decree was a public
relations exercise (Bioxham 2005, 33). Unfortunately for the Armenians, the
Tanzimat reforms were never fully applied and the reform era ended in 1871
(Walker 1980, 100).
The introduction of reform within the Empire changed the subservient and
super-ordinate relationship between the Muslims and non-Muslims within the
empire. Less toleration was extended as non-Muslims vied for a place of
equality within society. It is suggested by Bioxham that British pressure in 1850
to incorporate a Protestant millet changed the Ottoman millet system. The
changes to the millet formed the initiative for reform movements within the
Empire (Bioxham 2005, 43). Bioxham notes that traditionally the millets had
functioned as little theocracies. The millets had essentially governed themselves
differences in the two resided in: Hatti Humayun went further in its rhetoric of inter-religious
equality and secularization, and its view of an inclusive common Ottoman identity; Hatti Humayan
made no reference to Islamic law and confirmed that apostasy from Islam would not be
punishable by death; and Military service, administration of justice and taxation, and entry into
schools and public employment were to be equally relegated to Muslims and non-Muslims. Lastly
Hatti Humayan stipulated the need for adherence to annual budgets, establishment of banks, use
of European skill and capital, and codification of penal and commercial law. Interestingly,
Bioxham mentions that the 1856 decree was deemed necessary because of the lack of progress
made since the 1839 decree, but also the need to tie in the aspirations of the large Christian
population with the future of the state thereby deterring interventions by other states on behalf of
the Christians (Bioxham 2005, 31).
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and simply coordinated their policies with the Ottoman Empire. The introduction
of the Protestant millet by the British initiated reforms in the constitutions of the
other millets, the Catholic, Jewish, Greek and Armenian millets. A separation in
religious and civil affairs was introduced along with the idea of democratic
representation (Bioxham 2005, 43).
Bloxham’s research argues that the changing of state structure and
ideology provides an explanation for the occurrence of genocide. He presents
evidence of this claim by evaluating the relationship between the Ottomans and
Armenians before the second half of the 19th century (Bioxham 2005,15).
Armenians were regarded as non-Muslims monotheists. They occupied a
position in the Islamic theocracy that was legally assured but were considered
subordinate. Although there was a superior and subservient relationship
between the Ottomans and the Armenians, they co-existed. Bioxham regards
Ottoman toleration in his research: “Ottoman toleration of non-Muslims
compared favorably with the record of many European states toward their
religious minorities” (Bioxham 2005,15).
Nationalism ensued following the flop of the Tanzimat era. Turkish
resentment for foreign power involvement in Ottoman affairs invoked a nationalist
response. Foreign powers advocated for a disturbance in the hierarchical natural
order of super-ordinate and subordinate Muslim and non-Muslim relationship. It
is apparent that the Tanzimat era introduced minorities to the concept of reform
and equality. In 1828, Greece successfully fought its war for independence. In
1876, after staging a rebellion the Ottomans massacred the Bulgarians in an
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incident referred to as the “Bulgarian Horrors”. Also, from 1875-1900 the Balkan
states petitioned for reforms. In 1887, the Russo-Turkish war was fought. At the
conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war the Treaty of Berlin was drawn up.
The Treaty of Berlin proved extremely important in two ways. The treaty
promised reforms for the Balkan states and the Armenians. Article 23 in the
Treaty of Berlin promised reforms for the Balkan states. Article 61 promised
reforms for the Armenians. The Treaty of Berlin facilitated partial autonomy for
the Bulgarians and initiated the process of Balkan succession. Alliances
between Balkan states were formed in opposition to Ottoman rule by 1912.
Massacres by the Turks ensued in response to the coalescing in the Balkans. In
October and November the Balkan states warred against the Ottoman Empire.
Turkey suffered heavy losses to the combined fronts of Balkan armies. Turkish
sentiment was again marked by rage toward the Europeans for intervening. The
Turks were unable to accept the advocated notion of equality. In December of
1912 an armistice was declared. The London peace conference followed.
During the peace conference Turkey refused to give up European Turkey and
pay a war indemnity. War continued in the Balkans through the spring of 1913.
At the conclusion of the Balkan conflict the Turks lost 70 percent of their
European population and 85 percent of their European territory. Russia
mobilized on the Caucasian frontier and informed Turkey that if there was war in
the Balkans again they could not promise neutrality. Germany responded to
Russia, claiming that an attack on Turkey might trigger an all-out European war.
The Balkan states provided the impetus for the Armenians to take a closer look
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at their reform efforts. The Balkan wars also forced the Ottomans to look at what
should be done with the Armenians. Armenians were forming revolutionary units
and were perceived to want their own independent state. The Armenian question
came into existence.
Morgenthau comments on the consequences of the withdrawal of the
allied fleet from the Dardanelles (Morgenthau 1919, 274). England, France,
Russia and Italy had after a century, lost influential power and control in Turkey.
The Turks were free agents; they were no longer dependent on the European
powers. “For the first time in two centuries they could now live their national life
according to their own inclinations, and govern their peoples according to their
own wills” (Morgenthau 1919, 274). “The Turks freedom from European tutelage
was celebrated by murdering a million of its own subjects” (Morgenthau 1919,
274).

Political Crisis
The CUP may have seen it as beneficial to the Empire to polarize the
Muslim and non-Muslim groups following the Balkan wars. As Ottoman territory
waned and former Ottoman states gained independence, the Ottoman Empire
faced the reality that it may collapse. Ultimately, the triumvirate was unwilling to
face the loss of additional territory and people. As the international community
and the Armenians advocated for more equality, the Young Turks began to view
requests for equality as indicative of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.
The Armenian question, which is often referenced as a cause for the
genocide that unraveled, developed in the last decades of the nineteenth century
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(Dadrian 1995, 34). It is suggested that Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin invoked
a sense of Armenian nationalism the Turks felt they had to crush (Dadrian 1995,
35).
Armenians formed the largest element in the population in the six
provinces in the north-eastern part of Asia Minor, bordering on Russia. This
geographic area is known as Armenia. The territory which the Armenians inhabit
forms the connecting link between Europe and Asia. The mere geographic
residence of the Armenians formed an area of contention between the Turks and
Armenians (Morgenthau 1919, 287). The Armenians lived in the mountainous
plateau between Turkey and Russia. The Russians posed a threat to the Turks
because they were not allied. In 1914, the Turks instigated war with Russia. In
the early days of 1915, the Turks were defeated by the Russians in a battle
waged by Enver at the Russian military base of Sarikamish. The defeat
cumulated in the loss of three-quarters of Enver’s army (Walker 1980,199). The
relationship between the Turks and the Armenians proved extremely contentious
after Enver suffered a humiliating military defeat.
Turkish nationalism rendered a disgraceful provision of services to nonTurkish subjects within the empire (Suny 1993, 25). The Armenians experienced
severe discrimination at the beginning of the 20th century under the rule of Abdul
Hamid II (1876-1909). The Armenians rebelled against discriminatory practices.
The Ottoman Empire responded to Armenian self defense with brutality.
Between 1894 and 1896, a policy of Massacre was advanced to maintain the
decaying empire (Suny 1993,105-106). Sultan Abdul Hamid was unable to
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complete his intended destruction of the entire Armenian population because
foreign powers threatened to get involved.
In 1908, Sultan Abdul Hamid was overthrown by the Young Turk
Ittihadists. The Young Turks promised liberty, justice and equality for all Ottoman
subjects. Initially, the Armenians and minorities were pleased by the Young Turk
rise to power (Suny 1993,106). In fact, the Dashnaktsutiun revolutionary party,
an Armenian political party, had been allied with the Committee of Union and
Progress. The Armenians were pleased by the Young Turks intent on restoring
the liberal constitution. Social hostility between peoples of the empire developed
as the Young Turks rose to power (Suny 1993, 106). The reversal of the
traditional Mustom-dhimmi hierarchy created resentment toward Christians,
Europeans, and elements of European life filtering into the Ottoman Empire
(Suny 1993, 107). The policy of the Young Turk government during World War I
changed the party’s original conviction. The political policy became a
revolutionary project to completely alter the ethnic and political balance in
Eastern Anatolia. The goal of the project was to permit the eventual creation of a
Turkic Empire (Suny 1993,106). According to Vahakn Dadrian, the leaders of
the Young Turk Ittihadists “recognized the pervasive influence of Islam in the
country, and resolved to exploit it in their plans to eliminate the sources of
domestic nationality conflicts” (Dadrian 1995, 5).
The Ottoman Empire’s commitment to maintaining a hierarchical relation
with minorities left the Armenians two choices: they could remain silent victims of
state injustice, or organize to defend themselves. In response to their

47

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

deteriorating situation the Armenians formed a small revolutionary movement,
although they preferred to petition the government and the Western powers
(Suny 1993, 98-99).

Economic Crisis
In 1876 the Ottoman Empire declared bankruptcy (Bioxham 2005, 36).
Bloxham’s research posits that the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire
was a comprador class.15 The non-Muslims Armenians cooperated economically
with Europeans in the region because they benefited from the trading privileges
passed on by the Europeans through the capitulatory system.16 The Greeks and
Armenians were depicted as having different interests then the Islamic Ottoman
state. They were seen as forestalling the development of the Muslim bourgeoisie
and inhibiting Turkish national development. The depiction of Greeks and
Armenians as economically more sound was adopted because of the
disproportionate number of minorities occupying commercial and financial
positions in Istanbul and western Anatolia (Bioxham 2005, 18).
In addition, Christian social visibility increased in certain social sectors.
Those sectors happened to be evident to visitors in western cities and to
Ottoman elite in Istanbul. The 1838 Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty stimulated
international trade. Bioxham regards the founding of anti-Christian sentiment:

15 A comprador class is essentially a class that acts as an intermediary in the business affairs of
foreign establishments.
16 In 1569 France was granted the concessions of the capitulations. These were granted to other
European powers and made permanent. They were originally granted willingly by Ottoman rulers
as a way of bestowing favor and consolidating alliances. The capitulatory system granted legal
and economic privileges for citizens of the Christian powers and their Christian clients living in the
Islamic state (Bioxham 2005,12).
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According to Bioxham as it regards the Armenians, “the anti-Christian
stereotype was founded upon urban merchants, moneylenders, and
middlemen and rural traders; upon certain regions and elements of the
agricultural economy, notably in Cilicia; and upon the association of
Armenian success with Westernization and foreign influence, because of
the Armenian importation of Western technologies and the diasporic
character of Armenian trade networks (Bioxham 2005, 41).

Bioxham argues that Christians were simply trying to maximize their economic
situation. They were not intentionally disregarding the interests of the Empire
(Bioxham, 41).
By 1914, the economic situation in the Ottoman Empire was in a state of
failure. In fact, Talaat confided to Morgenthau that there was no money in the
Turkish Treasury (Morgenthau 1919, 37). The treasury was in a more exhausted
state than normal because of the closing of the Dardanelles. The blockading of
the Mediterranean ports had stopped all imports and customs dues.
The peasantry plunged into starvation at the outbreak of World War I.
Thousands were dying daily of starvation in Turkey. The starvation was the
result of government looting and the recruitment of men into the army. The
government looted the civilian population of their livestock and looted materials
from merchants and shop men with the thought that World War I would be quick
and they would replace what they had taken (Morgenthau 1919, 64). In addition,
all able bodied men had been recruited into the army. This action left behind
only a few men to till the fields. Food production severely declined. A million
families were left without breadwinners resulting in destitution. In addition, the
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inadequate amount of money the soldiers received resulted in the deaths of
thousands from starvation (Morgenthau 1919, 66). The empire lost a quarter of
its Turkish population in the beginning years of the war.

Elite Response
Hovannisian provides a concise, concrete analysis of the process by
which the Young Turks and the CUP came to power. There was opposition to
Sultan Abdul Hamid among the Armenians and among emigre centers.17 The
Young Turks formed societies that drafted ideas to keep the Ottoman Empire
from collapsing. Most patriotic Turkish leaders believed that only an institution of
efficient, just government could save the Ottoman Empire.18 Anti-Hamidian
opposition was renewed in the Ottoman Empire during the early years of the 20th
century. Ahmed Riza’s Young Turk faction merged with anti-Hamidian’s to form
Ittihad ve Terakki, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Ittihadists
marched on Constantinople and demanded that the constitution be restored.
Abdul Hamid agreed to play the role of constitutional monarch on July 24, 1908.
A cabinet of Ittihadists assumed the control of the government (Hovannisian
1967, 29). In 1909, after succumbing to an attack by conservative Turkish
elements supporting Abdul Hamid, the Committee of Union and Progress
dethroned and exiled Abdul Hamid. By 1911, dissension within the Committee of
Union and Progress resulted in the formation of the Liberal Union. The Liberal

17 These are centers where people were forced to migrate for political reasons. Such centers
existed in Geneva and Paris
18 Ahmed Riza was a Patriotic Turkish leader.
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Union pledged the original revolutionary goals. In 1913, an Ittihadist counter
coup brought dictatorial nationalist elements to the forefront of the Committee of
Union and Progress goals (Hovannisian 1967, 30). The assassination of Nazim
Pasha brought down the Liberal Party. Mahmud Shevek Pasha, the grand vizier,
was assassinated in June of 1913, which opened the door for Talaat to become
minister of the interior and later in 1916 Grand Vizier. Enver became minister of
war, and Jemal became minister of the Navy (Balakian 2003,159). Talaat,
Enver, and Jemal represented the new ruling triumvirate.

Perception of Threat
In wake of the Balkan wars and the initiation of World War I Balakian feels
that the Young Turk trio was anxious about the future of the empire (Balakian
2003, 160). Talaat was able to promote a nationalist ideology and propagate a
policy of genocide as a solution to abate societal ills. According to Balakian, “the
CUP waged a campaign of race annihilation against the Armenians by deeming
them the internal enemy” (Balakian 2003,166).
Balakian suggests that with the loss of Christian states in the Balkans, the
Ottoman government grew more unstable and the ruling elite fell under attack
(Balakian 2003,159). In addition, the coup staged by the nationalist faction of
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) on January 26,1913 significantly
shifted power in the Ottoman Empire. The assassination of Minister of War
Nazim Pasha brought down the liberal party. The nationalist faction of the CUP,
lead by Talaat and Enver seized control of the government (Balakian 2003,159).
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The military defeat of Enver’s army by Russia in the winter of 1915 is
viewed as a political crisis that contributed to the foundation for the occurrence of
genocide. Enver allegedly scapegoated the Armenians as responsible for the
defeat of his army, claiming the Armenians acted as spies (Walker 1980,199).
Deportation of the Armenians was viewed as a viable solution to ensure there
was no further collaboration between the Armenians and the Russian army (Suny
1993, 109).

Findings
Abdul Hamid, the “Red Sultan,” first devised a scheme to forestall
disruptions in the Turkish Empire. Between 1895 and 1896, 200,000 Armenians
were massacred. Abdul Hamid was forced to abandon his aim to destroy an
entire race because England, France and Russia threatened to intervene if the
Sultan progressed as he had planned (Morgenthau 1919, 288-290). The
Committee of Union and Progress led by Talaat and Enver adopted Abdul
Hamid’s Armenian policy and decided to do away with the subject people all
together. Their goal was to terminate them wholesale and Turkify the empire by
massacring the non-Muslim elements (Morgenthau 1919, 286). The Young Turk
goal rested upon murdering every living Christian.
According to Suny, the state encouraged anti-Armenian hostility from
Muslims by creating an Armenian scapegoat. The defeats and failures of the
Ottoman government could be blamed on the Armenians (Suny 1993, 106).
“Armenians were seen as responsible for the troubles of the empire, allies of the
anti-Turkish European powers, and the source of politically radical ideas

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

including trade unionism and socialism” (Suny 1993,108). The idea of an
Armenian alliance with the Russians may have been perceived by the CUP as a
threat to the retention of Turkish political power.
Chief propagandist of the Committee of Union and Progress, Ziya Gokalp,
played a role in the dissemination of nationalist ideology (Balakian 2003,163.)
Ziya Gokalp advocated that Turkey could only be revitalized if it rid itself of its
non-Muslim elements. He advocated for a return to the Golden age; the preIslamic era of Turkic warriors. Gokalp believed that the Empire’s return to it’s
great military past and a homogenous nation were essential for the strength of
Turkey (Balakian 2003,165). Gokalp wrote:
a nation must be “a society consisting of people who speak the same
language, have the same education and are united in their religious and
aesthetic ideals— in short those who have a common culture and religion
(Balakian 2003,165).

In addition to the nationalist propaganda disseminated by the CUP’s chief
propagandist, the sheikh-ul-lslam’s published proclamation of Jihad summoned
the Muslim world to arise and massacre its Christian oppressors (Balakian 2003,
169). Balakian suggests that Jihad pamphlets appealed to the need to
exterminate all Christians (Balakian 2003, 170).
The CUP instructed the scapegoating of the Christian population for the
defeat suffered by the Turkish army in the Caucasus. The CUP asserted that
large numbers of Armenian soldiers in Van and other Armenian provinces
deserted, crossed the border, and joined the Russian Army. The Armenian’s
knowledge of roads and the terrain was propagated as an important factor in the

53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Russian victory (Morgenthau 1919, 294). “Treasonable behavior of the
Armenians of Van provided an excuse for the subsequent treatment of the whole
[Armenian] race” (Morgenthau 1919, 295). The Armenians were scapegoated as
revolutionists (Morgenthau 1919, 300).
Morgenthau’s conversations with Talaat provide evidence that
scapegoating occurred. In early April when hundreds of Armenians were
deported to the interior from Constantinople, Talaat told Morgenthau that the
government was acting in self defense (Morgenthau 1919, 326).
“The Armenians at Van, he said, had already shown their abilities as
revolutionists; he knew that these leaders in Constantinople were
corresponding with the Russians and he had every reason to fear that they
would start an insurrection against the central government. The safest plan,
therefore, was to send them to Angora and other interior towns"
(Morgenthau 1919, 327).
At another time Talaat explained to Morgenthau that the Armenians were
in constant correspondence with the Russians (Morgenthau 1919, 333). “These
people, he [Talaat] said, refused to disarm when we told them to. They opposed
us at Van and at Zeitoun, and they helped the Russians. There is only one way
in which we can defend ourselves against them in the future, and that is just to
deport them” (Morgenthau 1919, 335).
In a meeting with Morgenthau, Talaat explained that the objections to the
Armenians were based on three distinct grounds:
In the first place, they [the Armenians] have enriched themselves at the
expense of the Turks. Armenians have regarded themselves as Europeans.
They speak and Indo-European language and are thought to be of the
Aryan race. Their religion is also the religion of Europe (Morgenthau 1919,
288). In the second place, they are determined to domineer over us and to
establish a separate state. In the third place, they have openly encouraged
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our enemies. They have assisted the Russians in the Caucasus and our
failure there is largely explained by their actions. We have therefore come
to the irrevocable decision that we shall make them powerless before this
war is ended (Morgenthau 1919, 337).

Morgenthau argued with Talaat about his justification for the ill treatment
of Armenians. Talaat responded:
It is no use for you to argue, we have already disposed of three quarters of
the Armenians; there are none at all left in Bitlis, Van, and Erzeroum. The
hatred between the Turks and the Armenians is now so intense that we
have got to finish with them. If we don’t, they will plan their revenge
(Morgenthau 1919, 337-8).
Genocide was viewed as a viable policy by the extremists in an effort to deflect
culpability for societal ills. The perceived threat to the retention of Turkish
political power felt by the CUP weighed in on the development of a radical
extremist policy of genocide to rid the Armenian threat to Turkish power.
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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The study examined factors that may have led elites to perceive a threat
to their power and consequently respond by introducing a radical extremist policy
to diffuse the threat. An answer to the first question asked in this study: what
makes the ground ripe for genocide seems to lie in the evaluation of factors that
may instigate elites to question the status of their power. Economic crises,
political crises, international pressures, and the pre-existence of a polarized
society are all variables present in the Rwandan and Armenian cases. These
factors seem to play a role in the elite’s choice to adopt a policy of genocide.
An answer to the second question: How do elites come to view genocide
as a viable policy solution may be found in the evaluation of the elite’s perception
of a threat. Akazu and the CUP were unwilling to share their political power.
They adopted a policy of genocide to eliminate the threatening aspect of society
and diffuse those advocating for changes to the political status quo. The study
suggests that the mere existence of a threat and the possibility of the threat
remaining unabated leads to a more radical extremist approach to removing the
threat.
In both cases similar events unfolded. The figures below depict the
similarities.
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Rwandan Case
Independent
Variables
Polarized Society

Hutu/Tutsi
Belgian Colonization, Akazu

Economic Crisis

Staple Export Plummets on Int’l Market
SAP’s Devalue Currency
Rise of Akazu-Hutu Power
Civil War
Rwandan Patriotic Front

Political Crisis

International Pressures Arusha Accords

Figure 2. Evidence of independent variables in the Rwandan case.

Armenian Case
Independent
Variables

Polarized Society

Muslim Turks/non-Muslim Armenians
British - Protestant Millet 1850
Turkish Nationalism 1915

Economic Crisis

Turkish Treasury Exhausted
Closing of Dardanelles

Political Crisis

CUP Coup 1913
Balkan War
Defeat by Russia 1915

International Pressures

Treaty of Berlin Article 61

Figure. 3. Evidence of independent variables in the Armenian case.
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Akazu and the CUP scapegoated the minority groups for the societal ills within
the states. They sought to deflect culpability to retain political power.

Implications
A perceived threat to the power held by elites in countries where
polarization has occurred, economic and political crises are occurring, and
international demands to democratize pressure governments, may be indicative
of a cause for adopting a policy of genocide.
As the United Nations, various non-governmental organizations and other
nations continue to attempt to resolve conflicts between intrastate groups they
may find it beneficial to evaluate whether economic and political crises exist,
whether polarization has occurred and whether the international community is
advocating for a change in the political status quo of the country. They may also
be on the look out for the occurrence of scapegoating propaganda to minority
groups. De-escalation of genocidal tendencies may lie in dissuading elites from
perceiving these factors as threaten the retention of their power.
Continuing to research causes of genocidal violence may facilitate the
termination of such horrific violence. Understanding that economic and political
crises, international pressures, and the presence of a polarized society threaten
elite’s perception of their power may provide a piece of the puzzle that could
ultimately bring to an end to genocide in the 21st century. Further research into
the role international pressures play on elite’s perception of the status of their
power may provide interesting insights. Understanding why genocide occurs and
how a genocidal policy is adopted is a huge endeavor. This research hopes to
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have impacted the scholarship currently in circulation, adding yet another
dimension to the understanding of the adoption of a policy of genocide.
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